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ABSTRACT   
 
With the rapid growth of smartphones and tablets in our daily lives, securing the sensitive data 
stored upon them makes authentication of paramount importance. Current authentication 
approaches do not re-authenticate in order to re-validate the user’s identity after accessing a 
mobile phone. Accordingly, there is a security benefit if authentication can be applied 
continually and transparently (i.e., without obstructing the user’s activities) to authenticate 
legitimate users, which is maintained beyond point of entry. To this end, this paper suggests a 
novel transparent user authentication method for mobile applications by applying biometric 
authentication on each service within a single application in a secure and usable manner based 
on the risk level. A study involving data collected from 76 users over a one-month period using 
12 mobile applications was undertaken to examine the proposed approach. The experimental 
results show that this approach achieved desirable outcomes for applying a transparent 
authentication system at an intra-process level, with an average of 6% intrusive authentication 




medium and low), the average intrusive authentication request was 3% which indicates a clear 
enhancement and suggests that the system would add a further level of security without 
imposing significant inconvenience upon the user. 
KEYWORDS:  Transparent authentication, mobile applications, mobile security, usable 
security biometric authentication, smartphones, tablets. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The use of mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets has grown steadily and has become 
an essential part of the daily lives for many people. Common examples of usage include 
activities such as sending emails, transferring money via mobile Internet banking, making calls, 
texting, surfing the Internet, viewing documents, storing medical, confidential and personal 
information, shopping online and playing games. Some of these active applications are 
considered sensitive and confidential, and the risks are high in the event of the loss of sensitive 
data as a result of privacy breaches (Tam et al., 2015; Patel et al., 2016). After authentication 
at the point of entry using techniques such as a personal identification number (PIN) or 
password, the user of the device can perform almost all tasks, of different risk levels, without 
having periodically to re-authenticate in order to re-validate the user’s identity (Clarke et al. 
,2009).  
Furthermore, the current point-of-entry authentication mechanisms consider all applications on 
a mobile device to have the same level of importance and thus do not apply any further access 
control rules unless the applications themselves incorporate those (Clarke et al., 2009). As a 
result, Clarke et al. (2009) argue that different applications require different security provision. 
For instance, a bank account requires a different level of protection compared with a Short 




which might be a feature for defining a suitable level of security (Ledermuller and Clarke, 
2011).  
It is also argued that, within a single mobile application, there are different processes operating 
on the same data but with differing levels of risk. For instance, the unauthorised disclosure or 
modification of mobile data has the potential to lead to a number of undesirable consequences 
for the user. Thus, there is no single level of risk associated with a given application and the 
risk level should, instead, change during use (Alotaibi et al., 2016). In this context, a novel 
mobile application data risk assessment model has been proposed to appreciate the risk 
involved within an application (intra-process security) (Alotaibi et al., 2016a). To this end, a 
transparent and continuous authentication mechanism provides a basis for convenient and 
secure re-authentication of the user and gathers user data in the background without requiring 
any dedicated activity (Clarke et al., 2009; Chuang et al., 2018). 
This research suggests a novel transparent user authentication method for mobile applications 
by applying biometric authentication on the smartphone’s application actions-level based on 
the risk level. For instance, WhatsApp application contains different level of action risks such 
as send a text message which is considered high risk whereas receiving an audio message is 
considered a medium risk and receive a free call (voice/ video) is considered low risk. In 
addition, mobile phones can be used to capture multiple biometric modalities such as facial 
recognition, voice recognition and fingerprint recognition by utilising microphones, camera, 
keypads and GPS without disturbing the honest mobile users. More specifically, the user 
biometrics are captured and collected in the background by regularly and periodically checking 
user behaviour in order to continuously monitor the protection of the smartphones. For 
instance, if the user uses the mobile phone for reading a message/email, watching a video, 
making or receiving a call or video conference, the mobile phone might be able to capture face 




based on his biometric signals and when the user tries to access to a high-risk service such as 
transferring money form mobile banking application, the computed confidence has to be more 
than the threshold for this service, otherwise the system rejects and asking for PIN or username 
to be entered (intrusive authentication). In this study, after collecting a user’s actions, the 
biometrics scenarios are applied.  
Within the remainder of the paper, section two presents a review of current state-of-the-art 
literature on transparent and continuous authentication for mobile device security. Section three 
then presents a novel transparent user authentication mechanism for mobile applications, 
followed by the research methodology employed. A full experimental study is presented in 
section four to test and discuss the proposed approach. Finally, conclusions and future work 
are highlighted in section five. 
2. Related work  
In terms of usability and security, biometric authentication has been considered a reliable 
solution for authenticating users when compared with secret knowledge-based (password and 
PIN) and token-based (smart cards) approaches (Al Abdulwahid et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 
2018). Biometrics are classified by their use of physiological biometrics, such as fingerprint 
scanning or face recognition, or behavioural biometrics, such as keystrokes or touch. 
Physiological biometrics are commonly considered useful mainly for one-off authentication 
(De Marsico et al., 2015; Meng et al., 2015) because they require considerable computing 
power and high-quality images, which are not easy to obtain (Meng et al., 2015). For instance, 
iris recognition needs the user to face the camera, takes more time for authentication and 
requires high-cost additional hardware (Meng et al., 2015). Moreover, there are still challenges 
for iris recognition, such as detection, segmentation, coding, and matching (De Marsico et al., 




(De Marsico et al., 2013). As a result, iris and fingerprint scanning methods are considered 
intrusive (Clarke, 2011). In contrast, behavioural biometrics refer to something the user does, 
such as typing, gait, application usage, voice or signature, which are considered to be less 
sensitive to, for example, darkness or noise (Tanviruzzaman and Ahamed, 2014).  
Clarke (2011) defines Transparent Authentication Systems (TAS) as follows: “Transparent 
authentication can be achieved by any authentication approach that is able to obtain the sample 
required for verification non-intrusively”. In this context, TAS can be described in terms such 
as implicit, passive, non-intrusive, unobtrusive, unobservable, active, and silent. Google, for 
example, has plans to use a continuous and transparent authentication mechanism instead of 
user name and password (Hatin et al, 2017). Furthermore, Gartner estimates that behavioural 
biometrics will replace passwords by 2022 (Data Protection Centre, 2018). 
In addition, behavioural biometrics are presented as a suitable method and are more commonly 
used for transparent and continuous authentication and for providing usability (Clarke, 2011; 
Hatin et al., 2017). In prior works, various behaviour-based authentications were presented to 
verify the rightful owner of a device, such as those based on touchscreen input behaviour, 
application usage, and patterns relating to keystrokes, calls and texts, voice, physical location 
and micro-movements (Khan and Hengartner, 2014), due to the ability of smartphones to gather 
a user’s behavioural data without requiring deliberate actions from the user or additional 
hardware. For example, Apple has introduced a new patent for a “Fingerprint Sensor in an 
Electronic Device”, in order to move the sensor from the home button to a new location below 
the touchscreen. This will allow fingerprints to be read from any point on the touchscreen 
surface (Yousefpor et al., 2014). Furthermore, although facial recognition suffers from certain 
problems, such as the difficulty of authentication in the dark and changes over time (Tresadern 
et al., 2013), it could be used in a transparent authentication system to collect a sample without 




whether the authenticated user is the true owner of the smartphone and maintain security. Apple 
has also introduced Face ID to provide secure authentication for the iPhone X (Apple, 2018; 
Juniper, 2018). Fingerprints will also be used for transparent authentication in the near future 
(Feng et al., 2012; Koundinya et al., 2014). In this context, TAS for mobile devices have been 
summarised and classified into the following (Alotaibi et al., 2015): keystroke, gate, touch, 
device sensor, and behavioural profiling. 
A number of studies have investigated the feasibility of using behavioural biometrics to secure 
a mobile device, and several have proposed application usage aimed at providing transparent 
authentication. For instance, Hayashi et al. (2012) argue that device-centric continuous 
authentication cannot discriminate between data from different applications. More broadly, the 
authors argue that this method cannot make any assumptions in terms of the importance of the 
application currently being used. More specifically, not having a device-centric approach, and 
a lack of awareness of the task that the user is performing within an application, can lead to not 
delivering authentication control at the task level (Khan and Hengartner, 2014). This leads to 
higher authentication overheads. Hayashi et al. (2012) comment on the inefficiency of the all-
or-nothing access model and suggest that a mobile user should be authenticated only when a 
sensitive application is begun, since most applications do not require explicit authentication. In 
the context of a sensitive application concept, the authors created paper prototypes (i.e., a 
theoretical method) for two alternative access mechanisms: group accounts and an activity 
lock. The group account would provide access to some of the functionality that is normally 
available only when the phone is unlocked. Thus, this group is for sharing non-sensitive 
information or applications. In comparison, an activity lock can be activated by the device 
owner before handing the device to another user to share specific screens in an application. 
Conversely, configuring a group account on a device enables the device owner to share a 




In the same context, the work of Riva et al. (2012) is based on when the user should authenticate 
(as opposed to how) and for which application. The authentication decision depends on the 
levels of confidence and sensitivity for each application, which are stated by the user to protect 
sensitive applications from unauthorised use. The result of this prototype was a 42% reduction 
in requested explicit authentication, but was conducted with only nine users. A similar but more 
thorough study was conducted on positive (i.e., familiar events) and negative (i.e., unexpected 
changes of predictable places) habits. Among further studies in a similar context, Li et al. 
(2011) introduced a behaviour profiling approach to identify mobile device misuse by focusing 
on the mobile user’s application usage; namely, general application usage, voice calls, and text 
messaging. The proposed approach achieved a total Equal Error Rate (EER) of 7.03%.  
Efforts have also been made to investigate the feasibility of combining biometric modalities to 
authenticate a mobile user. Clarke et al. (2009) proposed a framework called Non-Intrusive 
Continuous Authentication (NICA) to provide secure, transparent and continuous 
authentication. NICA uses keystroke dynamics, facial recognition and voice patterns to inform 
the alert level while the user interacts with the mobile device. NICA is based on ‘authentication 
confidence’, which is mapped to each service in order to allow the user to access a service if 
the confidence level is higher than the alert level. In this work, the authors take into account 
the hypothesis that different services require varying levels of security and protection by 
understanding the risks associated with specific user actions and services, such as transferring 
money from an online banking application. 
Crawford et al. (2013) introduced a transparent authentication framework utilising a 
combination of behavioural biometrics: keystroke dynamics and voice recognition based on 
device confidence level. In this research, each task on a device is assigned a particular device 
confidence level as the minimum threshold for access to the task, either explicitly by the owner 




device confidence level. This method is similar to online banking systems, in which the user 
needs to perform a task that might have side effects: the bank system requires a further 
authentication step for the user to be authorised (Crawford et al., 2013).  
Similarly, Saevanee et al. (2012) examined the combination of three diverse biometric 
methods: keystroke dynamics, behavioural profiling and linguistic profiling. By using this 
multimodality, they achieved a total EER of 3.3% from 30 virtual users (this dataset was not 
real and was gathered from different datasets). To continue their work, Saevanee et al. (2014) 
presented a text-based authentication framework utilising those modalities and introduced a 
level of security by allowing the user to set different security levels for accessing different 
applications. The researchers claim that this approach would reduce the number of intrusive 
authentication requests for high-security applications by 91%. Likewise, Fridman et al. (2015) 
proposed a parallel binary decision-level fusion architecture for active authentication. This 
fusion is used for classifiers based on four biometric modalities: text analysis, application usage 
patterns, web browsing behaviour, and the physical location of the device by computing GPS 
(outdoors) or Wi-Fi (indoors) coordinates. To evaluate this framework, the authors collected a 
dataset from 200 users’ Android mobile devices for 30 days. After one minute of the user using 
the device, the ERR was 5%, whereas after 30 minutes the EER was 1%. Despite the promising 
results of this work, battery consumption was the main limitation.  
Unlike previous work, the current research suggests the need to move an access control system 
from the application level (inter-process) to within the application (intra-process) based on the 
risk for each user action as shown in Figure 1. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, applying 
a transparent authentication system to each process within an application based on the risk level 
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Figure 1. Identity Confidence and the actions risk level timeline  
 
3. A Novel transparent user authentication approach for mobile 
applications  
Having considered the contributions of prior work, the aim of this research is to propose an 
intelligent transparent authentication framework for intra-process security for mobile 
applications to fulfil security obligations and provide continuous protection by ensuring the 
validity of the current user. More specifically, this paper investigates the following research 
question: 
Are transparent authentication systems applicable to intra-process resolution (within 
a given application) based on the risk level for each service in a secure, continuous, 
transparent manner by utilising a combination of device owner’s biometrics based on 





3.1. A proposed framework 
A framework based on Clarke and Furnell (2007) was used to address the above concept, as 
shown in Figure 2. The proposed framework consists of a number of key components, 
including a Data Collection Engine, a Biometric Profile Engine, and an Authentication Engine. 
These engines perform various tasks, such as collecting biometric data, generating user 
profiles, and verifying the user’s identity, respectively. There are two main system components. 
The first is the Authentication Manager, which controls the three engines referred to previously, 
sets the confidence level, observes the current security level and makes authentication decisions 
if the user requests access to a service within the application (intra-process). The 
Authentication Manager achieves this by comparing the risk level value for this intra process, 
which is retrieved from the Risk Database, with the confidence level value, which is calculated 
by the Authentication Engine. If the process risk value exceeds the threshold (confidence level), 
the user will be allowed access. However, if the process risk value is less than the threshold, 
the user will be denied access to the service. The second main system component is the Intra-
Process Determination System, which observes the user’s action on a specific application. This 
value is passed to the Authentication Manager to compare with the risk value for the process 
(a predefined value). The risk value is based on this new component. The novel elements are 
the ability to determine and identify the current user action on the application (intra-process), 
which is the key task of the Intra-Process Determination System. The outputs from this 
component are the application name and the intra-process name within this application, both 
of which are sent to the Authentication Manager in order to decide the legitimacy of the user 










































Figure 2. Framework for mobile application security (adapted from Clarke and Furnell, 2007) 
 
To fully address the above research question, the following tasks were undertaken: 
 Firstly: producing a novel mobile application data taxonomy (Alotaibi et al., 2016) and 
then introducing a novel mobile application data risk assessment model to understand 
the risk involved within an application (intra-process security). This investigation 
demonstrates that there is no single risk for using a given application, since the risk 
changes within the application from one process to another and determines the risk level 
for each process on a single application (Alotaibi et al., 2016a). 
 Secondly: developing user action determination software in order to create a real dataset 




 Thirdly, conducting a series of experiments aimed at investigating the feasibility of the 
proposed system by testing the impact of the intra-process access on the overall 
transparent user authentication approach for mobile applications through a series of 
experimental analysis studies. These experiments were aimed at computing all intrusive 
user authentication requests by collecting log data from a total of 76 participants over 
a month of normal device usage. 
3.2. Dataset 
In order to investigate the feasibility of building a transparent and continuous biometric-based 
system, it is first necessary to collect samples of genuine user interactions with their mobile 
devices/apps based upon a substantive period of real-world use. As such, it was proposed to 
enlist participants and collect log data from them after one month of normal device usage. It 
should be noted that participation did not require the participants to do anything other than use 
their devices as normal. This experiment involved collecting the sort of data that are logged, 
such as a timestamp of the application used by the participant and the name of the user action 
(read, send, etc.). The experiment was carried out using the participants’ Android mobile 
phones (start date: February 2017; end date: July 2017).  For the purpose of this data collection, 
Python code was written utilising the Android Debug Bridge (ADB), which is a command line 
tool that allows communication with a connected Android device on a computer and was 
developed to extract log files from a backup file on the participants’ devices after taking a 
backup . 
In addition, some applications, such as Facebook, Online Mobile Banking, and Chrome, are 
fully encrypted, and there was no means of collecting user data without compromising users’ 
privacy by asking the participants to root their device. For this reason, only 12 applications 




Google Play, Email, Viber, Google Photo, Camera, and Yahoo mail. In which some users have 
used all of the listed applications while others used some of them. At the end of the collection 
process, data had been collected from 76 users and they were ready for the analysis phase. Each 
user’s data were stored in an individual text file and each record contained the following fields: 
a date in two formats (human time and a timestamp e.g., 2016-06-28 20:22:30, 
1467141750071), application name, action type, extra information, such as message/email 
length, and call duration.   
3.3. Methodology 
This experiment was conducted to explore the feasibility of building a transparent and 
continuous biometric-based system that would provide more secure and user-friendly 
authentication for mobile applications. The proposed approach was based upon assessing intra-
process (within the application) user interactions and testing the impact of an intra-process 
approach on the overall transparent user authentication for mobile applications by including 
application access with other actions within the application for 76 participants. Before starting 
the data analysis, a risk model (MORI) (Alotaibi et al., 2016a) was used to calculate the risk 
level for each action within each application. Finally, each user’s data were updated after 
applying the risk model and stored in an individual text file to calculate the possible biometrics 
and then confirm the identity of each user.  
A wide range of biometrics were used in this research: facial, voice and iris recognition, 
keystrokes, behavioural and linguistic profiling, and fingerprint recognition, due to the ability 
of smartphones to capture multiple biometric modalities. Moreover, EERs published in prior 
studies in this domain were also used in this study. It was also considered that, if a user uses a 
mobile phone to read a message/email, watch a video, or make or receive a free call or video 
conference, the phone might be able to capture face samples. In this simulated scenario, 




Likewise, EERs for finger samples of 3.74% (Raghavendra et al., 2013), keystroke samples of 
2% (Zahid et al., 2009), voice recognition of 7.80% (Woo et al., 2006), iris samples of 0.12% 
(Chen et al., 2012), and linguistic profiling samples of 12.8% (Saevanee et al., 2015) were also 
selected. Moreover, if a user uses more than three application at a time, it might be possible to 
utilise a behavioural profiling biometric, so a prior EER of 7.03% was selected to assess this 
(Li et al., 2011).  
In order to compute an identity confidence level based on the simulated biometric scenario, a 
weighted majority voting (WMV) formula (Al Abdulwahid, 2017) was utilised. In this 
approach, for each individual biometric technique, weights are assigned inversely 
proportionate to their EERs. More specifically, based on the WMV, a lower EER corresponds 
to a higher weighting than a high EER (Al Abdulwahid, 2017). Furthermore, a number of 
scripts were developed in order to extract the biometric information collected and identity 
confidence generated for each user to match the threshold which, in this research, was the risk 
level for each action. 
NICA was selected to analyse the data and compute the identity confidence level (Clarke et al., 
2009). The NICA framework is designed to be a mobile-based solution by utilising a 
combination of secret knowledge authentication and a number of biometric techniques in order 
to provide transparent and thus continuous authentication while the user interacts with the 
mobile device, despite an intrusive request at the beginning of the session (Clarke et al., 2009; 
Al Abdulwahid, 2017). In addition, the main aim of this framework is to observe the level of 
trust of the user in order to allow or restrict access to applications or services. Furthermore, 
based upon the biometric samples captured, the level of confidence fluctuates in a continuous 
manner (Clarke et al., 2009), which has an effect on permissions to access applications. More 
specifically, if no biometric samples are captured to cause the confidence level to exceed the 




To provide effective security in a NICA system, two security mechanisms are considered 
imperative and define the core operation of the framework: Alert Level (AL) and Integrity 
Level (IL). These two levels are mapped to confidence levels to maintain security within the 
system, as well as its usability (Clarke et al., 2009; Al Abdulwahid, 2017). NICA has a function 
that is defined as a degradation function, to decrease the value of the Integrity Level (-0.5) 
periodically every 30 minutes for frequent users and 50 minutes for infrequent ones, as defined 
by NICA (2007), when the device is inactive.  
During a specific time window, the AL process seeks valid samples. If there are no samples, 
the identity confidence level will be periodically reduced by a degradation function that is 10% 
of current confidence in order to protect the mobile device the mobile while it remains inactive. 
In the case of the mobile user requesting to perform a task, the IL is applied to check the 
legitimacy of the mobile user. If the identity confidence is greater than or equal to the specified 
risk action level, transparent access is allowed. Otherwise, an intrusive authentication request 
is required in order to proceed with the service. 
In summary, each user file from the dataset was produced to generate different files. The first 
file was produced after applying the risk model (Alotaibi et al, 2016) and the second after 
generating possible biometric samples and then computing the identity confidence value. 
Finally, the two files were compared and matched at a specific time. If the confidence level is 
more than the threshold (action risk level), the user can access the service (non-intrusive 
authentication request); otherwise, the mobile device is locked (intrusive authentication 
request).  This methodology was applied to each user file in order to compute the number of 
the intrusive authentication requests made during the intra-process (within the application) 
access to evaluate the average for the intrusive authentication requests for all 76 users. To do 
this, a number of scripts were generated and run with the participants’ data for a combination 




AL 10 min and IL 10 min; AL 20 min and IL 10 min; and AL 20 min and IL 20 min. The 
reason for changing the time window each time was to provide further insight into whether this 
would affect the number of intrusive authentication requests for each user. 
4. Experimental Results and Discussion  
In this study, the main aim is to compute the number of intrusive authentication requests (i.e. 
entering PIN or username and password): the higher the percentage of intrusive requests 
becomes, the less usable the system. It should be noted that there is no need to calculate 
biometric accuracy such as false positive and false negative as the biometric was simulated. 
With regard to the average user intrusive request distribution for intra-process access based on 
minimum, median, and maximum values over the differing time windows, the largest time 
window (AL=20/IL=20 min) achieved better results due to the majority of the average users’ 
intrusive request distributions being less than 10% of the total average user intrusive request 
distribution. For instance, participant 35 achieved 13% intrusive authentication requests. In 
contrast, the shortest time window (AL=2/IL=5 min) achieved the worst result due to the 
majority of the average users’ intrusive request distributions being about 20% of the total 
average user distribution. For instance, the average intrusive distributions for three of the 
participants (2, 29 and 46) were 37%, 36% and 38%, respectively. Interestingly, when the AL 
was the same value (e.g., AL=10/IL=10 min; and AL=10/IL=20 min), the average user 
intrusive request distribution was the same and the majority were less than 9%. Similarly, the 
case for the time windows AL=5/IL=5 min and AL=5/IL=10 min was the same, but the 
majority were near to 15%. 
The experimental results for the percentages of intrusive authentication requests for six time 
windows for intra-process access were calculated and are summarised in Table 1, together with 




requests decreased, ranging from 18% to 6%. In general, the larger the AL/IL time window, 
the fewer the authentication requests. This suggests there could be a high probability of 
capturing a number of biometric samples when a user interacts with the mobile device for long 
periods and does not recall a degradation function to reduce identity confidence when the 
device is inactive. However, this is not the case for short time intervals and does not, therefore, 
allow the mobile user to increase the identity confidence if the number of actions is low. In this 
context, the longest time window (AL=20/IL=20) attained the lowest average intrusive requests 
of 6%, which might act in the interests of usability but not security. The reasons there is no 
biometric samples while active degradation function at this short interval. More specifically, 
during the time window AL=2/IL=5 min, six participants (2, 12, 29, 46, 55 and 58) received 
more than 30% of the percentage of intrusive requests, possibly due to the total number of 
actions being very low compared with the total usage days and the number of actions per day. 
For instance, 27,576 actions were collected from participant 46 over 592 days, which represents 
about 46 actions per day. This low number of actions per day led to the highest number of 
intrusive requests of all the users (38%) and might affect the total average authentication 
requests (18%), as shown in Table 1.  
Table 1. Average percentages of intrusive authentication requests 
  
                             
Time window (min) 
 
AL=2 AL=5 AL=5 AL=10 AL=10 AL=20 
IL=5 IL=5 IL=10 IL=10 IL=20 IL=20 
Average intrusive requests (%) 18 13 13 9 9 6 
Total requests 3,006 k 
Intrusive requests ≤ 10%  (# users) 16 29 27 45 46 67 
10% < intrusive requests ≤ 15% 10 24 28 24 23 9 
15% < intrusive requests ≤ 20% 21 9 14 6 6 0 





One possible reason is that during the data collection stage, 47 actions were collected with the 
following distribution of risk types: high risk = 36%; medium risk = 47%; low risk = 13%; and 
no risk = 4%. As a result, the majority of these actions (83%) were considered to be high and 
medium risk. Figure 3 depicts the intrusive/non-intrusive request results with the types of risk 
for all the time windows, which, in turn, suggests that the identity confidence level should be 
higher to exceed the threshold for accessing the required service. The experimental results also 
show that the majority of intrusive requests came from high-risk actions. It seems to be the 
case that the majority of intrusive requests came from high-risk actions, only a few from 
medium-risk actions, and none from low-risk actions. For instance, for the AL=2/IL=5 min 
time window, 16% of the total average intrusive requests (18%) were triggered by high-risk 
actions and only 2% of the total average intrusive requests from medium-risk actions.   
Non Intrusive High Risk Intrusive Medium Risk Intrusive Low Risk Intrusive 
AL = 2 min and IL = 5 min AL = 10 min and IL = 10 min  
Figure 3. Intrusive/non-intrusive intra process results at AL=2/IL=5 min and AL=10/ IL=10 min 
 
Further analysis was conducted to establish whether a particular grouping of time windows 
would perform better with a particular type of usage. To gain greater insight into how usage 
could affect the total average intrusive authentication requests for the entire dataset, the 76 




following average actions per hour (with the thresholds being set based upon values observed 
from the dataset): 
If (Actions per hour) > 5, then High Usage  
Elseif (Actions per hour) > 2, then Medium Usage 
Elseif Low Usage 
As a result, there were 27 users with high usage, 24 users with medium usage, and 25 users 
showed low usage. After applying this methodology to the 76 participants, there was a clear 
need to investigate how low user usage would affect the total average intrusive authentication 
requests by recomputing the total average intrusive authentication requests for each usage 
group.  
The following two figures (Figures 4 and 5) provide examples of the relation between the 
identity confidence levels and the intrusive authentication requests timeline for high user usage 
and low user usage, respectively. In Figure 4, the user confidence level continuously fluctuates 
based on the biometric samples captured, as does the risk level for the user action. Although 
there is a high fluctuation for this period, only one intrusive authentication request was 
triggered due to the biometric samples captured, thereby raising the identity confidence level 
for participant 57. In comparison, three intrusive authentications were requested during low 
user usage for participant 8. Furthermore, as seen in Figure 5, the user did not use the mobile 
from 18:11 PM until 18:32 PM and no biometric sample could be captured. For this reason, the 
confidence value was less than the threshold for accessing the required service and, therefore, 
the user was asked to enter a password or fingerprint for the authentication process. Similarly, 
no biometric samples could be captured between 19:01 AM and 19:23 PM and, as a result, 
identity verification decreased. However, the user’s confidence level was very high after 19:32 
PM, which suggests that the mobile user might have been able to take a high-risk action. This 
indicates that the more time between two consecutive actions, the greater the intrusive 





Figure 4. Confidence in relation to intrusive requests timeline for user 57 (high usage user)   
 
Figure 5. Confidence in relation to intrusive requests timeline for user 8 (low usage user)       
 
               
The above results demonstrate that one of the time windows (AL=10/IL=10 min) achieved 
better results in the high usage group, as 95% of the users’ intrusive authentication requests 
were under 8%. Similarly, in the medium usage group, 77% of the users’ intrusive 




requests were more than 14% for the low usage group. These experimental results suggest that 
AL=10/IL=10 min could be used for high usage and medium usage groups.   
Based on the above experimental results for the percentage of intra-process intrusive 
authentication requests, the total requests for the six time windows were calculated and are 
summarised in Table 2. The information in Table 2 indicates that this approach achieved the 
best results after classifying participants into three usage groups (high, medium and low) and 
identifies suitable time windows for each group of users. Table 2 also shows that the larger the 
AL/IL time window, the fewer the intrusive authentication requests, perhaps due to the high 
probability of gathering biometric samples when the user interacts with the mobile device and 
not recalling the degradation function and reducing the identity confidence level when the 
device is inactive. In Table 2, the intrusive authentication requests achieved better results than 
those previously reported in the first experiment for all the different AL/IL timings. For 
instance, for the same time window (AL=5/IL=5 min), the percentage of average intrusive 
authentication requests for all users was 13% in table 1, but this was reduced to 7% for the high 
usage group in table 2. In contrast, the percentage of average intrusive requests increased to 
21% after grouping the users in the medium usage group. 
Furthermore, the number of participants whose percentage of intrusive authentication requests 
was less than 10% sharply increased and represented the majority of the participants for all the 
differing AL/IL timings. Interestingly, only one participant (58) achieved a percentage of 16% 







Table 2. Average percentages of intrusive authentication requests by usage 
 
  
                             
Time window (min) 
 
AL=2 AL=5 AL=5 AL=10 AL=10 AL=20 









 Average intrusive requests (%) 12 7 7 5 5 3 
Total requests 2,045 k 
Intrusive ≤ 10% (# users) 6 21 21 27 27 27 
10% < intrusive ≤ 15% 14 6 6 0 0 0 
15% < intrusive ≤ 20% 5 0 0 0 0 0 












Average intrusive requests (%) 21 15 15 10 10 7 
Total requests 464,869 
Intrusive ≤ 10% (# users) 1 2 2 13 13 24 
10% < intrusive ≤ 15% 2 14 14 11 11 0 
15% < intrusive ≤ 20% 10 7 7 0 0 0 









 Average intrusive requests (%) 22 16 16 13 13 9 
Total requests                          496,096 
Intrusive ≤ 10% (# users) 1 4 4 6 6 16 
10% < intrusive ≤ 15% 3 7 7 12 12 9 
15% < intrusive ≤ 20% 7 8 8 7 7 0 
Intrusive > 20% 14 6 6 0 0 0 
 
It appears that the longest time window achieved a good result and reduced the number of 
intrusive authentication requests. For instance, the average intrusive authentication requests for 
AL=10/IL=10 min were fewer than for AL=5/IL=5 min by 2%. The change was clear for 
participants 28 and 48 by 5% and 2%, respectively. Interestingly, the experimental results for 
participant 71 for both time windows was the same for intrusive authentication requests at 3%. 
Furthermore, intrusive authentication requests changed very slightly (by 1%) for some of the 
participants: 3, 4, 11, 53, 60 and 64. However, there was a large difference between both time 
windows (AL=5/IL=5 min and AL=10/IL=10 min) for participants 15, 48, and 67, as the 
intrusive authentication requests reduced by 5% at the action level. 
It also seems to be the case that the longest time window showed a good result for the medium 




a better result with regard to intrusive authentication requests (moving from 14% to 7% and 
from 12% to 6%, respectively). Similarly, for the low usage group, the longest time window 
also showed improved results (from 9% to 7% at the action level). Interestingly, intrusive 
authentication requests changed very slightly (by 1%) for some of the participants, such as 5, 
22 and 72. In contrast, there was a significant difference at the action level for participants 29 
and 46, whose intrusive authentication requests reduced by 3% (participant 29 moving from 
14% to 11%). It appears that the majority of users achieved intrusive authentication requests 
of less than 10%. 
In summary, Table 2 indicates that a large AL/IL time window leads to fewer intrusive 
authentication requests. A possible explanation for the largest time window outperforming the 
shortest time window could be that a high number of user interactions with the mobile phone 
leads to the collection of many more biometric samples, thereby raising the identity confidence 
level. Furthermore, this study highlights a clear effect of AL value on average intrusive 
authentication requests. Likewise, recalling the degradation function significantly affected the 
total confidence level, which automatically dropped. This seems logical, as there could be few 
biometric samples or the modality might be poor in the case of a short time window. A further 
point to be noted in these results is that the vast majority of intrusive requests came from high-
risk actions and very few from medium-risk actions, whereas there was full transparency for 
low-risk actions. With regard to the system’s robustness and users’ convenience, a short time 
window is likely to lead to a large percentage of intrusive authentication requests, which could 
become a problem and disturb the mobile’s legitimate user. However, short time windows 
would lower the security of the system, which might, in turn, allow imposters to access 
services.  




This paper presented and evaluated a novel framework for transparent user authentication for 
mobile applications. An experiment was devised to explore the intra-process (within the 
application) access levels across different time windows. In summary, the experimental results 
demonstrate that this approach achieved results that would fulfil security obligations and a 
desirable level of results for applying a transparent intra-process authentication system. The 
shortest time window (AL=2/IL=5 min) produced an average of 18% intrusive authentication 
requests, whereas the largest time window (AL=20/IL=20 min) generated 6%.  
Interestingly, when the participants were divided into three levels of usage, the average 
intrusive authentication requests were 12% and 3% for the shortest (AL=2/IL=5 min) and 
longest (AL=20/IL=20 min) time windows, respectively for the high usage group. To examine 
the results more closely, further investigation was undertaken in order to explore how low 
usage would affect the total percentage of users’ intrusive authentication requests, by 
classifying the 76 participants into different types of users to gain greater insight to optimise 
the performance results and determine whether a particular grouping of time windows would 
perform better with a particular type of usage. Classifying the participants into three usage 
groups (high, medium and low) indicated notable improvement and achieved promising 
experimental results with regard to intrusive authentication requests compared with those 
previously reported in the first experiment for all differing AL/IL timings, from the shortest 
time window (AL=2/IL=5 min) to the longest (AL=20/IL=20 min). The results for the three 
usage groups underline the evidence for the effect of low user usage on the total average 
intrusive authentication requests for the selected time windows. This result suggests that there 
is a suitable time window for each usage group. It further suggests that there is a high 
probability of gathering biometric samples when the user interacts with their mobile device and 
the degradation function is not recalled to reduce the identity confidence level when the device 
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